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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 A federal grand jury indicted Rodolfo Bethancourt 
("Bethancourt") and Reginaldo Haynes ("Haynes")1 for conspiracy 
to import more than 500 grams of cocaine into the United States. 
After a pretrial hearing, the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey found that Bethancourt had knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights and concluded 
that a confession signed by Bethancourt would be admissible at 
trial.  The court also concluded that the discovery by the Drug 
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of $18,000 in cash at Bethancourt's 
residence would be admissible at trial. 
 After trial, the jury found the defendant guilty.  The 
district court then sentenced Bethancourt to 121 months 
imprisonment, five years supervised release and a $12,500 fine 
pursuant to a total offense level of 32 under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.").  Bethancourt timely appealed, 
raising a number of issues relating to his trial and sentencing.2 
                     
1Haynes was found incompetent to stand trial and ordered to 
undergo psychiatric evaluation. 
2He claims that: 
 
1. The district court abused its discretion by admitting his 
confession into evidence. 
2. The district court abused its discretion by admitting into 
evidence the fact that the DEA found $18,000 at his 
residence. 
3. The prosecution engaged in misconduct during closing 
arguments by vouching for government witnesses. 
4. The district court erred in enhancing his sentence under 
U.S.S.G. section D1.1(b)(2) for use of a non-commercial air 
carrier. 
5. The district court erred in enhancing his sentence under 
U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(c) for being a leader, organizer, 
manager, or supervisor. 
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We affirm. 
I. 
 The Government charged Bethancourt and Haynes with 
conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States.  Because of 
his United States military service, Haynes had access to military 
aircraft and he and Bethancourt planned that Haynes would obtain 
a military flight to Panama.  There, Haynes would pick up a kilo 
of cocaine from a contact arranged by Bethancourt, return to the 
United States, and deliver the cocaine to Bethancourt. 
Accordingly, Haynes flew to Panama and obtained the kilogram of 
cocaine.  He then attempted to board a military aircraft for the 
return flight to the United States, but was arrested before 
departing. 
 After his arrest, Haynes cooperated with the 
authorities.  The DEA flew Haynes back to the United States and 
he attempted to set up a meeting with Bethancourt.  Initially, he 
was unsuccessful, but after several attempts and one aborted 
meeting, Haynes met with Bethancourt and delivered a package 
containing fake cocaine.  The DEA arrested Bethancourt 
immediately thereafter.  Following his arrest, the DEA advised 
Bethancourt of his rights and had him sign a form in which he 
consented to the search of his residence and automobile.  When 
the DEA searched his residence, they found $18,000 in cash under 
his bed.  None of this is disputed. 
                                                                  
6. The district court erred in enhancing his sentence under 
U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1 for obstructing justice. 
7. His conviction violates double jeopardy. 
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 The DEA then interrogated Bethancourt.  He initially 
denied any involvement in the cocaine conspiracy, but eventually 
admitted his involvement.  After six hours of interrogation, he 
signed a typewritten confession detailing the conspiracy.  The 
district court admitted Bethancourt's confession and the 
discovery by the DEA of the $18,000 in cash in his house as 
evidence at trial.   
 Bethancourt appeals the admission of the confession, 
evidence of the discovery of $18,000 in cash under his bed, and 
the district court's enhancement of his base offense level from 
26 to 32.  On appeal, he also argues that the prosecution's 
rebuttal summation denied him due process and that in face of the 
Government's seizure of the $18,000 in cash, this conviction 
constitutes double jeopardy. 
II. 
 Bethancourt initially argues that the trial court erred 
by determining that he gave his confession voluntarily.   This 
court applies plenary review to a district court's determination 
whether a confession was given voluntarily. Miller v. Fenton, 474 
U.S. 104, 115-17 (1985); United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 63 USLW 3772 (1995).  "In determining 
whether a confession was voluntary, we must satisfy ourselves 
that the confession was the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker, that it was the product of a 
rational intellect and a free will, and that the appellant's will 
was not overborne." United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 289 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  The central question is whether 
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the authorities coerced the defendant's confession; if not, then 
the confession is voluntary. Id. 
 Bethancourt argues that his confession is clearly 
involuntary.  He contends primarily that he did not actually 
"sign" his confession because he affixed a distorted "signature" 
to the confession.  He maintains that the distorted and false 
"signature" demonstrated government coercion.  He also asserts 
that "[l]ogically, the only conclusion for this distorted 
signature is that [he] did not want to voluntarily sign his name 
to the document."  He contends that "[i]f he openly refused to 
sign the statement, the agents would have kept `working' on [him] 
in an attempt to obtain the statement that they wanted."  His 
decision to distort his signature on the confession does not show 
DEA coercion; on the contrary, it suggests that Bethancourt 
already was planning to circumvent the consequences of his 
confession. 
 Bethancourt testified at trial that he was handcuffed 
during the interrogation and that the DEA agents' manner was 
threatening.  Conversely, the DEA agents who took the confession 
testified that Bethancourt was not handcuffed, that they did not 
threaten him, and that they gave him a meal during the 
interrogation.  The trial court concluded that the DEA agents 
testified truthfully and that Bethancourt did not.  Therefore, 
the court adopted the DEA agents' version of the interrogation 
and confession.  We must do likewise because we will not review a 
district court's credibility determination. Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. 
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denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975).  In face of the DEA agents' credited 
testimony, Bethancourt's distorted signature does not warrant 
reversal of the district court's finding that the DEA agents did 
not coerce the confession. 
 The appellant also argues that his confession was 
coerced because he did not sign it until nearly six hours after 
his interrogation began.  However, the DEA agents testified that 
Bethancourt confessed to his involvement in the conspiracy after 
about two hours of interrogation; typing and verifying the 
content of the confession consumed the remainder of the time 
before he signed it.  The agents further testified that 
Bethancourt reviewed the confession and that he made some changes 
to it before signing it.  Thus, the implication raised by the 
defense that Bethancourt signed a government-produced confession 
after six hours of badgering is disingenuous.  The testimony 
credited by the district court showed that the appellant actively 
participated in the drafting and correction of his confession. He 
admits that he initialed every paragraph and signed each page of 
the confession after it was completed; he neither requested the 
assistance of an attorney nor complained that he was being 
coerced.  Except for his testimony on his distorted signature, 
Bethancourt does not point to any evidence showing that the DEA 
agents forced him to sign an incorrect or coerced confession.  We 
therefore see no error in the trial court's admission of the 
confession. 
 Appellant next argues that the district court abused 
its discretion by allowing the Government to testify that it 
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found $18,000 in cash at his home.  This court reviews a district 
court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1062 (1990). 
 Bethancourt contends that reference to the $18,000 
found in his home was inadmissible because the Government did not 
connect it with the charged offense.  Therefore, he argues that 
the money was irrelevant in this case.  The district court found 
that the $18,000 in cash hidden under Bethancourt's bed was 
"clearly relevant concerning knowledge, intent and ability to 
engage in narcotics transaction."  The court also concluded that 
"it's axiomatic that evidence concerning the possession or 
expenditure of large amounts of currency is admissible where the 
defendant is charged with a crime in which pecuniary gains [sic] 
is the basic motive." 
 This court will only find an abuse of discretion "when 
the action of the trial judge is clearly contrary to reason and 
not justified by the evidence." Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 
F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).  Here, the 
trial court held a hearing regarding the admissibility of this 
evidence, weighed the contrary arguments and concluded that 
testimony concerning the discovery of $18,000 in cash under 
Bethancourt's bed was relevant in supporting the Government's 
charge.  The trial judge's ruling is not "clearly contrary to 
reason" and the appellant's argument has no merit. 
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 On a more serious note, Bethancourt contends that the 
Government "tainted the fairness of the proceedings by vouching 
for government witnesses in this case" and thus that his 
conviction must be reversed.  In considering this issue, we note 
that it arises because the defense counsel initially qustioned 
the credibility of the government witnesses in his summation to 
the jury.  Specifically, he challenged the truthfulness of 
Special Agent Wagner's testimony relating to the taking of 
Bethancourt's toll records and all the other information secured 
from his residence.  Defense counsel also argued that the 
government agents typed up the confession and "they put stuff in 
there that [Bethancourt] was never gonna agree to;" and that 
faking his signature to the confession "tells you [the jury] that 
in no way are they the statements, are they the words, are they 
the concepts, or is that the confession of Rodolfo Bethancourt. 
It's theirs and they tried to make it his." 
 Such an argument and direct challenge to the conduct of 
the government agents required an appropriate response.  The 
defense on appeal strenuously argues that the response went far 
beyond permissible legal parameters.  The prosecution responded 
that there was no basis to the defendant's argument, pointing out 
the improbability of misbehavior by the government witness.  The 
prosecution reasoned:  "For what, ladies and gentleman?  He's 
gonna risk his career?  He's gonna risk his job?  He's gonna risk 
going to jail?  For what?  To lie to you on the stand, ladies and 
gentleman?  I submit not, ladies and gentleman."  The prosecution 
also argued that its witnesses "don't make up lies.  And they 
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didn't lie here and they're not lying to you, ladies and 
gentlemen, when they tell you what they did.  And they're not 
lying to you when they tell you that defendant, Rodolfo 
Bethancourt, talked to them about the statement."  The Government 
acknowledges that these remarks may have been "ill-advised," but 
contends that they were not prejudicial. 
 Defense counsel made no objection.  Therefore, an 
appellate court reviews the record for plain error.  In order to 
be plain error, an error must not only be "obvious," it must also 
"have affected the outcome of the District Court proceeding." 
United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778-79 (1993).  United 
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1125-26 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 500 U.S. 915 (1991).  "[W]e may only reverse if we find 
an error in the prosecutor's comments so serious as to `undermine 
the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a 
miscarriage of justice.'"  Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1126.   
 We do not believe that the prosecution's rebuttal 
constituted plain error.  Defense counsel, who represented the 
defendant at trial and on appeal, impressed us as articulate and 
experienced.  Yet, at the time of the prosecution's remarks, he 
heard nothing in the Government's response warranting any 
objection whatsoever.  The prosecutor's isolated and marginal 
comments in the course of a short rebuttal summation, which 
followed an untainted closing summation, did not "undermine the 
fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage 
of justice."  At most, they were harmless error.  Moreover, the 
district court gave clear instructions to the jury.  The court 
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specifically directed the jury's attention to the testimony of 
the law enforcement officers, their credibility, and the weight 
to be given it.  The court instructed the jurors that they alone 
should decide whether witnesses were credible and that the 
testimony of a witness is not more or less believable because the 
witness is an official.3   
 We have carefully reviewed the summations of counsel. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant and 
                     
3The judge charged as follows: 
 
You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the 
credibility of all witnesses and weight and 
effect of all evidence. 
 
 . . . 
 
It is for you to say whether a witnesses 
[sic] testimony at this trial is truthful in 
whole or in part in light of the demeanor, 
explanations, and all the evidence in the 
case. 
 
 . . . 
  
 Now, you've heard the testimony of law 
enforcement officers.  The fact that a 
witness may be employed by the federal 
government as a law enforcement officer does 
not mean that his testimony is necessarily 
deserving of more or less consideration or 
greater or lesser weight than that of it's 
ordinary witness.  At the same time its quite 
legitimate for defense counsel to try to 
attack the credibility of a law enforcement 
witness on the grounds that his testimony may 
be colored by a personal or professional 
interest in the outcome of the case.  It is 
your decision after reviewing all of the 
evidence whether to accept the testimony of a 
law enforcement witness and to give that 
testimony whatever weight, if any, you find 
it deserves. 
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the instructions of the trial judge to the jurors that they were 
the sole judges of the credibility of all witnesses and that the 
government witnesses' testimony was not entitled to any greater 
consideration because of their federal employment, the 
prosecutor's two isolated comments were harmless and did not 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice. 
 Bethancourt next disputes the two point enhancement to 
his base offense level under U.S.S.G. section D1.1(b)(2).  This 
section provides that a court can enhance a defendant's 
sentencing level: "If the defendant unlawfully imported or 
exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which (A) 
an aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial air 
carrier was used to import or export the controlled substance."  
 This court reviews a district court's finding of fact 
supporting an upward adjustment to a sentencing level for clear 
error, but applies plenary review to a district court's 
construction of the U.S.S.G. United States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 
448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Dixon, 982 F.2d 116, 
119 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2371 (1993); United 
States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 The appellant contends first that the language "[i]f 
the defendant unlawfully imported or exported" in section 
D1.1(b)(2) shows that this section only applies to the person 
actually transporting the drugs into this country and not to a 
recipient of the drugs.  The accuracy of this reading is 
irrelevant, however, because the jury convicted the defendant of 
conspiracy to import cocaine and he is liable for all the 
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foreseeable acts of his co-conspirator in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1863 (1994); United States v. Collado, 
975 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Carter, 576 
F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1978).   
 Furthermore, Bethancourt argues that U.S.S.G. section 
D1.1(b)(2) does not apply to him in this case, even if the 
relevant conduct of a co-conspirator can trigger it, because 
Haynes' use of a military aircraft was not foreseeable or in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
 He cannot show, however, that Haynes' use of a military 
aircraft was unforeseeable or that it was outside the scope of 
his agreement with the conspiracy.  Bethancourt knew that Haynes 
was going to Panama on a military aircraft; it was certainly 
foreseeable that Haynes would return on one as well. 
Additionally, Haynes' use of a military aircraft is clearly in 
furtherance of the cocaine conspiracy because it was an integral 
part of the plan to import cocaine into the United States. 
Therefore, the district court did not err when it enhanced 
appellant's sentence under U.S.S.G. section D1.1(b)(2). 
 Bethancourt next disputes the two point enhancement to 
his base offense level under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(c).  This 
section provides that: "Based upon the defendant's role in the 
offense, increase the offense level as follows: . . . (c) If the 
defendant was a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor in any 
criminal activity . . . increase by 2 levels." 
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 Bethancourt correctly notes that a 3B1.1(c) enhancement 
is only appropriate if the defendant directed and controlled at 
least one individual. United States v. King, 21 F.3d 1302, 1305 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  He argues that he exercised no control over Haynes, 
that in fact Haynes controlled him and that "there is simply no 
evidence to support the argument that [he] had control over 
anyone." 
 The Government responds with a long list of evidence 
contravening this contention.  First, the telephone conversations 
between Haynes and Bethancourt concerned only Haynes delivering 
the cocaine to Bethancourt; it did not involve splitting profits 
derived from the cocaine sale or selling the cocaine jointly.  
Second, Bethancourt arranged for his contacts in Panama to supply 
Haynes with a kilo of cocaine.  Finally, Haynes testified that 
Bethancourt was to pay him $500 for his services as a courier. 
The court found Haynes' statement to be credible.4 
 These facts provide the preponderance of the evidence 
necessary to justify an upward enhancement in appellant's 
sentencing level as a "leader, organizer, manager, or 
supervisor." See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 935.  We reject 
Bethancourt's argument that the district court improperly 
enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(c). 
                     
4Determining the credibility of witnesses is uniquely within the 
province of the trial court and this court will not review this 
determination. Gereau, 502 F.2d at 921. 
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 Next, appellant attacks the two point enhancement of 
his sentence under U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1.  This section provides 
that: "If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 
during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels." 
 Bethancourt correctly notes that the defendant must 
"wilfully" attempt to obstruct justice before the two point 
enhancement applies.  United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1397 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 
(3d Cir. 1992).  He does not, however, even attempt to show that 
the district court erred when it found that he intentionally gave 
materially false testimony.  The court concluded that Bethancourt 
intentionally lied in an attempt to exclude a valid confession 
and that this was an attempt to obstruct justice.  The court 
properly held that offering perjured testimony is an attempt to 
obstruct justice. See U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1 Application Note 
3(b).  Therefore, Bethancourt's contention that the trial court 
improperly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice has 
no merit. 
 Finally, Bethancourt argues that his criminal 
conviction violates double jeopardy because the Government seized 
the $18,000 which it found under his bed.  This issue is raised 
for the first time on appeal and therefore has been waived. 
United States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1989).  
 In any case, the double jeopardy argument is meritless.  
The Government notes that the $18,000 was not seized through a 
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court proceeding, but rather administratively by the DEA.  
Therefore, the seizure of the $18,000 is not relevant to the 
criminal sentence before this court because the seizure was not 
the result of any judicial direction or proceeding.   
III. 
 In summary, we perceive no error in any of the district 
court's evidentiary rulings or any denial of due process by the 
prosecution's closing rebuttal summation.  Moreover, the 
appellant has not drawn our attention to any judicial proceeding 
forfeiting the $18,000 discovered at his home.  Thus, there is no 
basis for his double jeopardy argument.  Finally, we see no error 
in the court's sentencing decisions.   
 Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence of 
the district court will be affirmed. 
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United States of America v. Rodolfo Bethancourt 
NO. 94-5670 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 I concur with the majority opinion except insofar as 
the majority concludes that the prosecutor's remarks do not 
constitute prejudicial plain error.   
 As my colleagues point out, the government concedes 
that the challenged portion of the prosecution's rebuttal 
summation was "ill-advised." Indeed, it was more. It was 
unethical, unnecessary, and I believe it raises doubts about the 
very verdict it sought to compel.  
 Failure to object to improprieties in a closing 
argument precludes appellate review in all cases except where 
`plain error' is established.  United States v. Lawson, 337 F.2d 
800, 807 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 919 (1965).  We 
must "correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial 
rights, if the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. 
Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993) (quoting United States v. 
Atikinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
The error here affects all three.  
 During his rebuttal address to the jury, Assistant 
United States Attorney John P. Suarez, the prosecutor here, 
responded to an attack upon a government agent's credibility by 
arguing as follows to the jury: "[f]or what, ladies and 
gentlemen?  He's gonna risk his career?  He's gonna risk his job? 
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He's gonna risk going to jail?  For what?  To lie to you on the 
stand, ladies and gentlemen?  I submit not, ladies and 
gentlemen."  That argument was forceful, responsive, and 
absolutely proper. Mr. Suarez was asking the jury to reach a 
common sense conclusion that the agent had too much to lose to 
commit perjury merely to convict this defendant. It was the kind 
of effective and logical response to an attack on an agent's 
credibility that has been made in countless numbers of closing 
arguments, and will be made in countless more.  
 However, Mr. Suarez was not content to let well enough 
alone. He insisted upon gilding the lily. Having made his point, 
he marched forward and assured the jury that government witnesses 
"don't make up lies.  And they didn't lie here and they're not 
lying to you . . . when they tell you what they did.  And they're 
not lying to you when they tell you that defendant, Rudolfo [sic] 
Bethancourt, talked to them about that statement."  That argument 
contains two serious improprieties. First, the prosecutor is, in 
no uncertain terms, telling the jury as a matter of fact that the 
particular witness didn't lie. Second, and I think even worse, he 
is telling the jury that government witnesses don't lie as a 
matter of policy.  
 In his opening statement, the defense counsel attacked 
the credibility of government witnesses as follows:  
You're going to hear the evidence and you're 
going to decide whether or not what they say 
happened happened . . . . 
 But I ask you, as the evidence comes in, 
listen very carefully and determine whether 
or not you accept what's on these transcripts 
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as being the evidence in this case because 
only you can make that determination. . . . 
   Listen to the evidence.  All right? 
Just listen to the evidence.  Don't jump to 
any conclusions here . . . . 
  
Supp. App. at 58-63.  Obviously, if the defendant was going to 
put on a defense, the defense attorney had to attack the 
credibility of the agent who took the defendant's statement. In 
his closing, defense counsel attempted to raise a reasonable 
doubt about the authenticity of the defendant's statement: 
 Is it reasonable for you to believe that 
because his signature that was contained on 
that statement was not his real signature but 
it was a fake, it was a disguise, what do you 
think happened?  I'm gonna suggest to you 
what you know from your common sense happened 
here.  They typed this stuff up, they put 
stuff in 
there that he was never gonna agree to and 
they wouldn't leave him alone.  He was there 
for six hours.  It's now midnight.  How did 
he get out of that room with these agents and 
get to go to jail which was probably a better 
place than sitting with them in that room 
even though he got a chicken sandwich?  You 
know what he did, yeah, okay.  And he forged 
his signature.  He faked it.  What does that 
tell you?  That tells you that in no way are 
they the statements, are they the words, are 
they the concepts, or is that the confession 
of Rudolfo [sic] Bethancourt.  It's theirs 
and they tried to make it his.  This is not a 
strange concept in the world.  This kind of 
attempts to put one thing on paper and get 
somebody else to agree with it by signing 
their name too it.  This is an old story. 
That's how he got out of that room.  And 
that's why Gus Lesnevich is so clear to you 
that if Bethancourt wrote that on there it's 
an intentional disguise.  You take it from 
there. 
 
Supp. App. at 497-98 (emphasis added). 
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 The defense counsel sought to have the jury draw 
certain conclusions from the testimony, and their own common 
sense. That was entirely proper. Yet, even if the defense 
attorney's argument had been improper, it does not justify the 
kind of response that occurred here.  The defense attack on the 
credibility of the government agent called for an appropriate and 
reasoned response. Mr. Suarez's rebuttal was neither. Over thirty 
years ago this court stated:  
A United States attorney in a criminal case 
has an even greater responsibility than 
counsel for an individual client.  For the 
purpose of the individual case he represents 
the great authority of the United States and 
he must exercise that responsibility with the 
circumspection and dignity the occasion calls 
for.  His case must rest on evidence, not 
epithet.  If his case is a sound one his 
evidence is enough; if it is not sound, he 
should not resort to epithet to give it a 
false appearance of strength. 
United States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961) (emphasis added). 
 When Mr. Suarez assured the jury that government agents 
"don't make up lies," and that they were not lying when they 
testified in this case, there is no doubt that he was asserting 
his personal opinion to the jury and, even worse, guaranteeing 
that the United States does not allow its witnesses to lie.  My 
colleagues state:  
 We do not believe that the prosecution's 
rebuttal constituted plain error.  Defense 
counsel, who represented the defendant at 
trial and on appeal, impressed us as 
articulate and experienced.  Yet, at the time 
of the prosecution's remarks, he heard 
nothing in the Government's response 
warranting any objection whatsoever.  The 
21 
prosecutor's isolated and marginal comments 
in the course of a short rebuttal summation, 
which followed an untainted closing 
summation, did not 'undermine the fundamental 
fairness of the trial and contribute to a 
miscarriage of justice.'  At most they were 
harmless error.   
 
Majority opinion at 9-10 (footnote omitted).  
 Over twenty years ago we addressed the problem of 
prosecutorial indiscretion in closing statements.  We were 
obliged to "consider such errors because of their recurrence in 
criminal trials and the consequent importance of emphasizing the 
impropriety of such practices by prosecuting officers. "  United 
States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1973) (Seitz, J.). 
We explained that "[w]e recognize the line between permissible 
and impermissible comment is a thin one, and precision of 
expression can be difficult.  Nevertheless, we strongly 
disapprove expressions of personal opinion by prosecutors on 
credibility and guilt."  Id.  Although we did not find the 
comments at issue in LeFevre to be sufficiently prejudicial to 
constitute reversible error, we were careful to "emphasize that 
the trial judge should be alert to each of these deviations from 
professional norms.  Since such comments have the clear potential 
of adversely affecting the defendant's right to a fair trial, the 
judge should take prompt action to correct them without relying 
upon defense counsel to object."  Id. at 480.  Soon thereafter in 
United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977), we deemed it necessary to 
again comment upon the "rash and inappropriate" remarks of 
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prosecutors during closing arguments.  In Homer, the court issued 
the following scolding: "[i]n recent years we have had the 
occasion to admonish counsel for thoughtless and inappropriate 
remarks made in the course of heated and vigorously contested 
trials. . . . [T]he comments are so grossly improper as to 
prejudice a defendant and deny him a fair trial." Id. at 867.     
  We have repeatedly had to address this problem. See 
United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1421-23 (3d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 770 F.2d 343, 348-51 
(3d Cir. 1985); United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1296-
97 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Scarfo, 685 F.2d 842, 848-49 
(3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1041-
43 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864, 867-68 
(3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 739-41 (3d 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470, 477-80 
(1970). Even though we held in each of these cases except 
Schartner that the particular statement did not constitute 
reversible error, this history demonstrates that our oft repeated 
refrain as to the impropriety and danger of such argument is 
falling upon deaf ears. 
 Moreover, we recently addressed a rebuttal that was 
nearly identical to the one before us here.  In United States v. 
DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1989), the prosecutor told a 
jury, "[w]e don't take liars.  We don't put liars on the stand. 
We don't do that." Id. at 999 (emphasis in original).  We 
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analyzed the likely effect of such a statement upon the jury's 
deliberations as follows:   
The remarks are better understood as meaning 
that the government, as a matter of policy in 
the prosecution of its cases, does not use 
liars as witnesses.  No explanation was 
given, however, of how the government 
ascertains the honesty or veracity of its 
witnesses.  Indeed, we have found nothing in 
the record upon which the prosecutor could 
have grounded his statement. . . . What the 
jury was lead to do instead was merely to 
infer that other information existed which 
the government used to verify the credibility 
of its witnesses prior to introducing their 
testimonies at trial. . . .  
 
 The possibility that the jury engaged in 
such deductive reasoning, prompted by the 
government's vouching of its witnesses, 
especially in light of the crucial nature of 
the witnesses' credibility here, clearly 
jeopardized the defendants' right to be tried 
solely on the basis of the evidence presented 
at trial. 
  
Id. at 999-1000.  Although this court subsequently decided that 
the per se reversal rule of DiLoreto could not stand under United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985), the analysis of the 
impact of the closing remains valid.5   
 Furthermore, our sister courts of appeals have also met 
with difficulty in stopping such abuse. In United States v. 
Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 846 (1st Cir. 1983), the court stated: 
 
 That despite our consistent warnings to 
the Government we should still be called upon 
to admonish against such conduct is 
reprehensible per se because it constitutes a 
                     
5
      See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir.) 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).  
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disregard to our directives.  But 
additionally it is particularly pernicious 
because it results in an unnecessary waste of 
judicial resources, both at the trial and 
appellate level, by diversion and attention 
to review of what by now should be understood 
to be totally unacceptable conduct by those 
who lay claim to representing the Government 
of the United States. 
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted: 
"[a] few injudicious words uttered in the heat of battle by an 
Assistant United States Attorney may undo months of preparation 
by police, prosecutorial, and judicial officers." United States 
v. White, 486 F.2d 204, 204 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United 
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1981) ("This 
Court, in particular, has repeatedly expressed frustration at the 
regular appearance on its docket of cases in which prosecutors 
have delivered improper summations."); United States v. Drummond, 
481 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1973) (reversing conviction following 
the third appeal involving improper summations by the same 
prosecutor). 
 Here, given the effect that the rebuttal may well have 
had upon the jury's deliberations, see DiLoreto, supra, and the 
serious and repeated nature of this type of transgression, I do 
not believe that the error was harmless, even despite the defense 
attorney's failure to object, and the curative instruction given 
by the attentive trial judge.  See Fed R. Crim. P. 52(a). ("Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded.")  
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 As noted above, I find our analysis of the nearly 
identical statements in DiLoreto compelling insofar as we there 
discussed the probable effect of such an argument upon the jury's 
deliberations.  When Mr. Suarez here vouched for the government 
agents, (indeed all government witnesses) his comments were not 
only prejudicial to Bethancourt, they also undermined the 
fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. I do not see 
how those remarks could have done anything other than corrupt the 
deliberations to the point that this defendant could not have 
received a fair trial.  Moreover, since the prosecutor apparently 
felt that the strength of his case required poisoning the 
deliberative process, I can not say that the evidence against 
this defendant was so "overwhelming" that the remarks were 
irrelevant to the determination of guilt.  Had the prosecutor 
felt that the evidence was so compelling I assume he would not 
have felt it necessary to resort to such an improper argument. 
 The reliability of the outcome of this trial, as well 
as the public perception of fairness dictate that we conclude 
that this error was not harmless and that it requires a new 
trial. The essence of the Government's case was the testimony of 
the agents who took the statement from the defendant.  Under 
those circumstances, the prosecutor's rebuttal can not be 
dismissed as harmless error.   
 Although I continue to believe that Young clearly 
prohibits a per se rule of reversal in cases such as this and 
DiLoreto, this case would present a strong argument for just such 
a rule if we were free to establish one.  Despite our best 
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efforts, some prosecutors continue to engage in behavior that can 
only corrupt the judicial process and undermine the very 
investigative and prosecutorial resources they seek to serve. 
They apparently do so with little or no concern for the effect of 
their actions upon the quality of justice, their positions as 
officers of the court, or the real possibility of causing an 
erroneous conviction. Yet, we continue to oblige their nonchalant 
approach to justice by finding their transgressions to be 
harmless.  
 Because such transgressions poison the deliberative 
process, I must respectfully dissent from the reasoning of my 
colleagues.  
